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Wage Distribution Impacts of Higher Education  
Faculty Unionization 
 
Charles S. Wassell Jr.,1 David W. Hedrick,2 Steven E. Henson,3 and John M. Krieg4  
 
Introduction 
A large body of literature suggests that unions affect the distribution of wages across 
workers. These impacts manifest themselves in several ways, and at several levels of 
aggregation. There is strong empirical evidence that unionization reduces wage dispersion or the 
variance of wages across all employees, job classifications, and skill levels at the 
macroeconomic and inter-industry levels.5 It is less clear how unions affect the distribution of 
wages across employees who differ by skill levels, job classification, seniority, or pay. At the 
inter-firm level, some unions, such as the United Auto Workers, attempt to standardize wages 
across competitors and thereby reduce inter-firm wage dispersion. At the intra-firm level, both 
the goal and the effects of collective bargaining are less clear. Past literature suggests the primary 
objective of unions is to raise overall wages, but unions may simultaneously decide to pursue 
egalitarian strategies that flatten the wage distribution across skill levels and/or job 
classifications. On the other hand, unions may bargain to increase remuneration to workers with 
greater seniority and tilt the wage distribution across seniority upwards. Unions may reduce 
wage dispersion both within and across establishments as well, via a flattening of the wage 
distribution across skill groups.6 There is supporting empirical evidence that unions flatten the 
distribution of wages across skill groups, but results have been limited due to a lack of 
observations of individual outcomes at both unionized and nonunionized firms. 
                                                 
1 Charles S. Wassell Jr., Ph.D. is Professor of Economics at Central Washington University. 
 
2 David W. Hedrick, Ph.D. is Professor of Economics at Central Washington University. 
 
3 Stephen E. Hensen, Ph.D. is Professor and Chair of the Department of Economics at Western Washington 
University. 
 
4 John M. Krieg, Ph.D. is Professor of Economics at Western Washington University. 
 
5 See Freeman (1994), Card (1992, 1996, 2001), Gosling and Machin (1994), Gosling and Lemieux (2001). 
 
6 Freeman (1980) shows this happens between white- and blue-collar positions within firms. 
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One industry in which high-quality worker-level data are observed at numerous firms, both 
with and without unionization, is higher education. Universities are comprised of faculty 
members in diverse fields of specialization with widely differing salaries. In addition, there is 
substantial variation in collective-bargaining status across institutions, particularly among public 
institutions, and in many cases across different faculty groups within the same institution. This 
combination of influences provides an excellent opportunity to investigate the impacts of 
collective bargaining on the wage distribution within and across establishments in the same 
industry. 
In a recent paper Hedrick et al. (2011) find that faculty unions have little impact on the 
average real salaries of full-time faculty at four-year institutions.7 This naturally brings up the 
question: If unionization has little impact on average full-time faculty real salaries, then what, if 
any, are the pecuniary impacts of faculty unions? To the extent that income is presumably the 
most important benefit of employment, a corollary question is why faculty unionize in the first 
place. One might expect a waning of interest in faculty unionization in higher education, 
corresponding to the recent slowing trend for unionization throughout the economy. However, 
Berry, Savarese, and Boris (2012) document overall participation in collective bargaining in 
higher education grew 8% over a five year period and argue recent NLRB rulings will increase 
this growth among private institutions. Although the explanations of why unions form are 
diverse and include non-economic determinants8, one possible explanation is that faculty unions 
lead to a more egalitarian wage distribution, to the benefit of a majority of faculty at a particular 
institution. 
In this paper we use data from the National Study of Postsecondary Faculty (NSOPF) to 
examine the impacts of collective bargaining on the distribution of wages across full-time faculty 
in different disciplines. Our results should be of interest both to researchers and policy makers 
concerned with faculty labor markets in higher education, and to labor economists more 
generally. Some additional motivation for our paper comes from the fact that most faculty unions 
are at public institutions. Previous studies9 have assessed the broad impacts of public sector 
unionization on wage dispersion, but not at the intra-firm level. Given the ascendancy of public 
sector unions, it is important to gain a deeper understanding of their effects. Using an 
                                                 
7 Notably, the paper does not assert that faculty unions have no impacts on full time faculty; rather, using the most 
comprehensive data and empirical methodologies available, there is no discernible, statistically significant impact on 
average real salary. 
 
8 See Hammer and Berman (1981) and Krieg et al. (2013). 
 
9 See, for example, Bahrami et al. (2009), Freeman (1986), and Lewis (1990). 
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instrumental variables approach, we find that unions cause the variance of wages across 
disciplines to shrink. However, the tightening of the wage distribution does not change average 
wages; collective bargaining thus benefits those at the lower end of the wage distribution and 
hurts those at the top end. 
Unions and the Distribution of Wages 
Union Effects on the Wage Distribution 
Studies of union impacts on the distribution of wages date back at least to Friedman (1956), 
who hypothesized that unions would increase wage dispersion. Card et al. (2004) provide a 
summary of the major literature in the intervening period. A significant proportion of this 
literature deals with the macroeconomic and inter-industry impacts of unions on wage dispersion 
(Lucifora, 1999). At these scales, a preponderance of the evidence indicates that unions raise 
overall wages and flatten the wage distribution, particularly when the bargaining units are highly 
centralized.10 
Similarly, there is considerable evidence that wage dispersion is decreased at the inter- and 
intra-establishment levels. These results were most strongly presented in a landmark paper and 
follow-up article by Freeman (1980, 1982). More recently, Frandsen (2012) uses a regression 
discontinuity approach based upon union certification elections to track individual earnings. 
Using data for U.S. workers from a variety of industries, he shows that unionization flattens the 
wage distribution: lower-paid workers gain, while higher-paid workers gain little or nothing.11 
By contrast, we find intra-establishment causality through the use of an instrumental variable, 
and specific to the higher education industry. 
A union-caused flattening of the wage distribution, on an intra-firm basis, may be either the 
direct result of the bargaining process, or an indirect result of workers with different 
productivities selecting to work at unionized versus non-unionized institutions. With regard to 
the first possibility, bargaining may result in higher-wage workers receiving a smaller union 
premium than lower-wage workers, or higher-wage workers suffering a larger loss under 
                                                 
10 Recent analyses using older data support these results. Firpo et al. (2009) utilize a quantile regression technique 
and data on over 250 thousand U.S. males from the 1983-85 Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) supplement of the 
Current Population Survey to show that unionization reduces overall wage dispersion by raising low-wage groups 
and lowering high-wage groups. Chernozhukov et al. (2013) utilize a more general distribution regression technique, 
along with ORG data from 1979 and 2008, and find that de-unionization increases between-group inequality. 
 
11 In an exception to the majority of the literature, however, Spetz et al. (2011) found little evidence that 
unionization explains any of the variance in nurse’s wages. 
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unionization than lower-wage workers, or a redistribution income from higher-wage to lower-
wage workers. If unions bargain for the median faculty member, then the wage distribution curve 
flattens out (i.e., there is wage compression). On the other hand, unions may also alter the wage 
distribution indirectly by attracting high productivity workers from low-paid disciplines and 
repelling higher productivity workers from high-paid disciplines. While it is difficult to 
disentangle these direct and indirect effects, both could be the result of unionization. 
In the case of higher education, a faculty member in a non-unionized setting can be 
considered to engage in Nash bargaining with a price-discriminating university administration. 
Wage negotiations occur on an individual basis and wage outcomes primarily reflect differing 
outside options of faculty members. In general, individuals with higher opportunity costs receive 
higher wages. Under unionization, the situation becomes a bilateral monopoly between the union 
and the university. Unions collectively bargain, and there is little opportunity for individual 
faculty members to take advantage of opportunity cost differences (except at time of initial hire 
or in the case of a competing job offer).12 Subsequent to hiring, increases in salary are typically 
based on measurable criteria such as rank and years of experience, rather than increased 
opportunity cost. Individuals with high opportunity costs but limited mobility lose economic 
rents (or quasi-rents), which are transferred to individuals with lower opportunity costs. This is 
the theory often discussed at the macroeconomic or industry level (Dell’Aringa and Pagani, 
2007; Barth and Zweimüller, 1993) and it is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Hosios 
and Siow (2004) regarding faculty unions. 
Despite the recent downturn in state support for public higher education, public universities 
continue to receive a majority of their funding from the state or via means influenced by the state 
(e.g. state tuition controls or advisories).13 There is little reason to believe that unionized 
institutions are able to elicit greater state appropriations, at least on a systematic basis. It follows 
that unionization would have a minimal impact on average faculty salary. However, while the 
total salary pool at a particular institution may be unaffected by unionization, the allocation of 
the available funds may change. 
To the extent that earlier studies of faculty unions have considered distributional impacts, 
they have tended to focus more on how unions affect the distribution of salaries across rank 
rather than across disciplines (Guthrie-Morse et al., 1981; Hu and Leslie, 1982; Barbezat, 1989; 
                                                 
12 To a lesser degree, additional individual bargaining may occur at times of promotion, typically through a proxy 
(e.g., a college dean bargaining on behalf of a faculty member with a provost). 
 
13 See Mitchell, Palacios, and Leachman (2014). 
4
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 4
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol7/iss1/4
 Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy  ISSN 1941-8043 
Vol. 7, December, 2015  
© 2015 National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education 
 
Hosios and Siow, 2004; Martinello, 2009). Only two studies of which we are aware have 
addressed unionization’s impact on the distribution of salaries across disciplines, and the results 
have largely been suggestive rather than conclusive. Barbezat (1989) tested the equality of mean 
salaries across selected liberal arts fields and found statistically significant differences at 
nonunionized institutions, but not at unionized schools. Hosios and Siow (2004) found that the 
difference between the salaries of the highest-paid and lowest-paid disciplines fell under 
unionization at doctoral institutions but either increased or was unchanged at other types of 
institutions. 
Below, we examine the distributional impacts of faculty unions at a much more 
disaggregated level by academic discipline. We estimate the separate effects of unions on the 
overall level of salaries and on the spread of the distribution, allowing us to identify which 
faculty groups (if any) gain, and which lose under collective bargaining. 
Wage Distribution and Union Formation 
Uniformity in wages is a well-documented result of industrial unions, at least at the 
macroeconomic level (Bennett and Kaufman, 2007). Thus, perceived wage inequality is likely to 
contribute to union formation. In higher education, if unions are unable to affect the average 
level of faculty wages as Hedrick et al. (2011) suggest, then they may refocus their emphasis on 
altering the distribution of wages. In particular, faculty with below-average wages might be 
motivated to form unions in hopes of obtaining wage gains at the expense of their higher-paid 
colleagues. If a majority of faculty in relatively low-salary disciplines benefit at the expense of a 
minority of higher-paid faculty, then median voter arguments suggest that unionization votes are 
likely to succeed. There are some unique aspects of higher education that make it well suited for 
our analysis. First, this labor market provides a case in which the basic tasks performed by 
faculty (teaching, research and service) are similar, but there are large and observable differences 
in salaries across disciplines among non-unionized faculty. These differences make it easier to 
identify wage effects among unionized faculty. Second, the higher education data provide an 
opportunity to develop a repeated cross-section of micro-level observations on faculty salaries 
with an extensive set of faculty- and institutional-level of controls to help reduce omitted 
variable bias that may confound the observed effects of unions on the wage distribution. 
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Model Specification and Data 
Model Specification 
We estimate a log-wage equation of the form: 
(1) ln(Yijkts) = αUnionijts + θDijkts + βDijkts∙Unionijts + δXijts + γZjts +λSs + ηTt + vj + εijkts 
where Yijkts is a measure of salary for the i
th faculty member at institution j in discipline k at time t 
in state s. Union is a binary variable that indicates whether the faculty member’s subgroup 
(defined as tenured or tenure-track versus non-tenure-track) is covered by a collective-bargaining 
agreement. D is a vector of dummy variables each representing one of 25 academic disciplines, 
X represents a vector of individual observables, and Z represents institutional variables including 
measures of local cost of living described below. State-level binary variables, S, control for 
unobserved state-level heterogeneity in faculty salaries, and T is a set of binary variables 
representing the individual survey years. The error term in this equation contains two 
components: vj, which represents an institution-specific error, and εijkts, which is associated with 
a particular faculty member at that institution. The coefficients of interest in (1) are α, which 
measures the overall percentage change in wages attributable to unions at an institution, and β, 
which measures the discipline-specific impacts of collective bargaining on wages. The sum of α 
and k is the overall impact of unionization on academic discipline k. 
Data Description 
The NSOPF is conducted roughly every five years by the National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES) of the U.S. Department of Education. To date it has been administered in 
1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004. Each cycle has used a similar two-stage sampling process. At the 
first stage institutions are sampled, and in the second stage faculty members are sampled from 
within the selected institutions. Faculty members are asked about their professional experience 
and background, responsibilities and workload, compensation, demographic characteristics, and 
opinions. In a separate institutional questionnaire, a representative of the school’s administration 
is asked about institutional characteristics, policies, faculty benefits, the total number of full-time 
and part-time faculty, student enrollment, and whether any faculty at the institution are 
represented by a union for the purposes of collective bargaining. Over all four cycles, a total of 
78,310 faculty and 1,900 institutional questionnaires have been returned. 
The NSOPF queries instructors, lecturers, tenure-track, and tenured faculty members at 
two-year and four-year higher education institutions. Previous studies (e.g., Ashraf (1998, 1999)) 
suggest that differential impacts of unionization can be expected across institution type and 
faculty status. In order to estimate these impacts as precisely as possible, we focus our analysis 
on full-time faculty members at four-year colleges and universities. This reduces the sample to 
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44,330 faculty observations at 1,060 institutions. After eliminating faculty whose principal 
activity is neither teaching nor research, those who had missing or imputed values of any 
explanatory variables, and those whose basic salary received from their institution was less than 
$20,000 or greater than $350,000 in 2004 dollars,14 we have a final sample of 24,180 faculty at 
1,060 different institutions. Table 1 presents the number of institution and faculty observations 
by survey year and Table 2 presents the replication pattern of institutions. While 8% of 
institutions are observed in all four surveys, nearly half of institutions appear in the NSOPF in at 
least two of the survey years. On average, we observed 22.8 individuals per institution per year. 
15 
Table 1 
Sample Size 
 Number of Institutions Number of Faculty 
Year NSOPF Sample NSOPF Sample 
1988 450 310 8,380 3,890 
1993 970 480 25,780 7,010 
1999 890 490 18,040 4,610 
2004 1,020 590 26,110 8,670 
Sum 1,900 1,060 78,310 24,180 
Note: Sample sizes are rounded to the nearest 10 to comply with NCES disclosure requirements. 
Columns may not sum to totals due to rounding. Because many institutions are repeatedly 
sampled over different years, the total number of institutions does not equal the sum of 
institutions over the four years. 
 
                                                 
14 The rationale for excluding very high and very low incomes is threefold. First, these exclusions are similar to 
those used by Monks (2000), and using similar exclusions allows easier comparisons with prior literature. Second, 
faculty at the extreme ends of the salary distribution are more likely to represent coding errors or “non-regular” 
faculty. For example, in the 1988 and 1993 surveys (the only years for which data exist on the duration of faculty 
contracts), over 60% of faculty with salaries below $20,000 held single-term appointments. Similarly, faculty at the 
highest salary levels are more likely to hold administrative or non-teaching positions. Third, when the sample is 
expanded to include incomes below $20,000 or above $350,000, the qualitative conclusions of the paper do not 
change. 
 
15 As we note elsewhere, many institutions were sampled multiple times. It is possible that individual faculty 
members may have been sampled more than once, but this would be purely coincidental and the NSOPF does not 
identify which, if any, faculty were repeatedly sampled. Faculty and institution counts are rounded to the nearest 10 
to comply with NCES confidentiality requirements. 
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Table 2 
Replication Pattern for Institutions 
Times 
Observed Survey Year Number of Institutions % Institutions 
4 
1988, 1993, 1999, 
2004 
80 80 8 8 
3 
1988, 1993, 1999 20 
160 
2 
15 
1988, 1993, 2004 20 2 
1988, 1999, 2004 30 3 
1993, 1999, 2004 90 8 
2 
1988, 1993 20 
240 
2 
23 
1988, 1999 30 3 
1988, 2004 20 2 
1993, 1999 50 5 
1993, 2004 50 5 
1999, 2004 70 7 
1 
1988 90 
570 
8 
54 
1993 140 13 
1999 120 11 
2004 220 21 
Totals  1,060 1,060 100 100 
Note: Sample sizes are rounded to the nearest 10 to comply with NCES disclosure requirements. Columns may not 
sum to totals due to rounding. 
Hedrick et al. (2011) demonstrate that the survey question the NSOPF uses to measure the 
presence of faculty unionization incorrectly identifies the presence of unionization for some full-
time faculty. This error is based upon the fact that the NSOPF assigns a single measure of 
unionization to an institution despite the possibility that an institution may have collective 
bargaining agreements with one faculty type (for instance, non-tenure track) and not another 
(tenured/tenure-track). We correct these measurement errors using data from the National Center 
for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions (NCSCBHEP) 
compiled by Boris (2006). The NCSCBHEP data identify the presence of collective bargaining at 
an institution separately for full-time permanent faculty, full-time adjunct faculty, and librarians. 
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Unfortunately, during the sample period tenured and tenure-track union status does not 
vary much within institution over time. Although 17.8% of observed institutions and 19.1% of 
observed faculty engage in collective bargaining, fewer than 10 of the 1,060 institutions switched 
collective b8argaining status for their tenure/tenure-track faculty within the four surveys in our 
sample and fewer than 30 institutions switched bargaining status among their non-tenure track 
faculty. This limited number of switchers implies that identification of the union impacts on both 
the overall level of wages and on their distribution relies upon variation in union status between 
institutions rather than within-institution variation over time. Because of the limited variation in 
union status within institutions, we estimate equation (1) using linear random effects models. It is 
also important to note that because the Union variable measures the presence of collective 
bargaining for groups of faculty within an institution and not an individual’s choice to be a union 
member, α + k measures the impact of collective bargaining on the wages of covered faculty 
and not the impact on wages of being a member of a union. 
Measure of Salary 
The NSOPF faculty survey asks numerous questions regarding financial compensation of 
individuals, including the value of the basic contract and opportunities for faculty to earn 
additional income from their institution. From these we utilize Basic Salary which represents 
payments made to faculty in exchange for fulfilling their basic annual contract and is the 
measure used by Monks (2000) and Hedrick et al. (2011).16 Basic Salary accounts for general 
inflation by choosing 2004 as the base year and adjusting all dollar figures in prior surveys 
upwards using the CPI. 
Both the NSOPF and the NCSCBHEP data identify a very strong geographical pattern of 
unionization. In the NSOPF data, the mid-Atlantic Census region and California contain 46% of 
all unionized faculty observations but only 23% of total faculty observations, suggesting that on 
average, faculty are significantly more likely to collectively bargain if they live in these areas. 
Since these regions are relatively expensive, failure to account for cost of living differences can 
                                                 
16 An alternative NSOPF measure is Total Salary which is equal to Basic Salary plus other supplementary payments 
from the faculty’s institution such as elective summer teaching, overload courses, and internal research monies. 
Unions may impact Basic Salary and Total Salary differently. For instance, institutions could respond to 
unionization by creating optional faculty duties external to the basic contract. In this case, unionization would 
increase Total Salary relative to Basic Salary. Alternatively, a union may frown on such payments and bargain to 
curtail them, or may bargain into the basic contract what were previously considered extra duties in exchange for 
increased Basic Salary, resulting in a smaller difference between Basic Salary and Total Salary. For the entire 
sample, the correlation between Basic Salary and Total Salary is 0.92, suggesting that any systematic differences 
that occur are relatively small. To be thorough, we estimate all equations using Total Salary rather than Basic Salary 
and find no substantive differences between the results so, for brevity’s sake, we report only Basic Salary herein. 
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cause the union wage premium to be overestimated. We therefore adjust salaries for cost of 
living using an index constructed from apartment rent data taken from the decennial U.S. 
Census. This rent index closely approximates the well-known ACCRA index published by the 
Council for Community and Economic Research, but has much wider geographic coverage. A 
detailed discussion of this procedure is given by Hedrick et al. (2011). 
Distribution of Salaries 
Faculty observations in the NSOPF are categorized into 25 different academic fields. Table 
3 orders fields by average Basic Salary adjusted for the cost of living using the rent index. The 
overall rent-adjusted average Basic Salary is $60,996; unionized faculty average $62,706, about 
3.5% more than the non-union average of $60,596. The data demonstrate significant variation 
between faculty in different fields. The lowest average salary is $50,601 in the visual and 
performing arts and the highest is $91,919 for faculty in legal professions and studies. A simple 
t-test of mean comparison demonstrates significant differences in remuneration between the 
union and non-union sectors for a majority of fields. 
Table 3 previews our econometric results. The median rent-adjusted cost of living salary is 
$55,569. Among the nine academic fields that average a salary below the median, the average 
benefit of unionization (the “Difference” column in Table 3) is $5,130, compared with $281 for 
the sixteen academic fields above the median suggesting that unionization benefits lower paid 
disciplines more than higher paid ones. 
The apparent union wage premium in Table 3 may be partly explained by differences in 
factors other than unionization. Table 4 demonstrates that faculty at unionized institutions 
average greater experience, both after earning their highest degree and at their current institution, 
and they are more likely to hold the advanced ranks of associate and full professor, to hold 
doctorates, and to be at larger schools. All variables in Table 4, as well as the cost of living 
measures17 and squares of experience and institutional enrollment, are components of X and Z in 
equation (1). 
 
                                                 
17 Because equilibrium wages are likely to vary less across locations than living costs, Dumond et al. (1999) suggest 
including the log and the log squared of the cost of living measure on the right hand side of a regression, a process 
followed here. 
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Table 3 
Basic Salary, Adjusted with Rent Index, by Discipline 
 Basic Salary Union Non-Union  
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Diff. 
Arts-visual and 
performing 
1,590 50,601 290 54,284 1,290 49,766 4,518*** 
English language and 
literature/letters 
1,750 51,126 360 55,752 1,390 49,923 5,828*** 
Foreign languages/ 
literature/linguistics 
1,210 51,470 210 57,001 1,000 50,280 6,720 
Library science 60 51,500 10 56,633 40 49,828 6,804 
Parks/recreation/leisure/ 
fitness studies 
250 51,618 60 56,228 200 50,278 5,950*** 
Communication/journ./ 
comm. Tech 
510 52,354 100 53,869 420 52,002 1,867 
Education 1,900 53,313 440 59,329 1,460 51,507 7,821*** 
Area/ethnic/cultural/ 
gender studies 
70 53,873 20 62,106 50 50,322 11,783*** 
Philosophy, religion & 
theology 
1,090 54,596 150 61,238 940 53,534 7,704*** 
Family/consumer 
sciences, human sciences 
180 56,131 30 57,333 140 55,862 1,470*** 
Other 400 54,760 90 57,121 310 54,049 3,072 
Multi/interdisciplinary 
studies 
60 57,070 10 54,117 50 57,765 -3,649 
Architecture and related 
services 
180 57,462 50 62,271 130 55,696 6,575** 
Mathematics and statistics 1,060 58,113 200 61,797 860 57,242 4,554*** 
Public admin./social 
services 
220 58,793 50 62,502 180 57,850 4,651* 
Psychology 930 59,490 190 62,929 740 58,596 4,332*** 
Social sciences (except 
psych) & history 
3,000 60,193 650 61,843 2,350 59,736 2,107** 
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 Basic Salary Union Non-Union  
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Diff. 
Computer/info. 
Sciences/support tech 
610 64,232 140 67,115 470 63,364 3,751 
Physical sciences 1,520 64,697 280 65,902 1,250 64,430 1,472 
Agriculture/natural 
resources/related 
410 67,368 90 66,287 320 67,658 -1,372 
Biological and biomedical 
sciences 
1,880 69,224 270 67,777 1,610 69,466 -1,690 
Business/management/ 
marketing/related 
1,610 69,361 320 71,177 1,290 68,916 2,260 
Health 
professions/clinical 
sciences 
2,190 71,470 320 70,107 1,870 71,704 -1,598 
Engineering 
technologies/technicians 
1,170 73,065 210 70,468 960 73,632 -3,164* 
Legal professions/studies 330 91,919 40 83,571 290 93,179 -9,608* 
Overall 24,180 60,996 4,590 62,706 19,590 60,596 2,110*** 
Note: *** {**} [*] represent statistical significance at the 99% {95%} [90%] level. 
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Table 4  
Descriptive Statistics: Sample Means & Standard Deviations 
   
Unionized 
 Non-
Unionized 
Basic Salary Real salary, 2004 base year 
63,626 
(21,365) 
> 
59,906 
(27,131) 
Exp Years at current institution 
12.62 
(9.89) 
> 
10.59 
(9.56) 
Degexp 
Years of experience since earning 
highest degree 
16.40 
(10.15) 
> 
15.12 
(10.17) 
Female Binary = 1 if female 
.347 
(.476) 
= 
.361 
(.480) 
Married Binary = 1 if currently married 
.727 
(.446) 
< 
.745 
.436 
Wasmarried Binary = 1 if previously married 
.111 
(.314) 
= 
.104 
(.306) 
Hispanic  
.051 
(.221) 
> 
.041 
(.197) 
Indian  
.012 
(.107) 
= 
.010 
(.098) 
Asian  
.077 
(.267) 
> 
.060 
(.237) 
Black  
.047 
(.212) 
< 
.054 
(.226) 
Pacific  
.002 
(.044) 
> 
.001 
(.031) 
Lecturer 
Binary = 1 if academic rank is 
lecturer 
.027 
(.161) 
= 
.030 
(.171) 
Instructor 
Binary = 1 if academic rank is 
instructor 
.033 
(.179) 
< 
.069 
(.254) 
Assistant 
Binary = 1 if academic rank is 
assistant professor 
.251 
(.434) 
< 
.307 
(.461) 
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Unionized 
 Non-
Unionized 
Associate 
Binary = 1 if academic rank is 
associate professor 
.294 
(.456) 
> 
.271 
(.445) 
Full 
Binary = 1 if academic rank is 
professor 
.385 
(.487) 
> 
.302 
(.459) 
Tenured Binary = 1 if tenured 
.675 
(.468) 
> 
.518 
(.500) 
Tentrack Binary = 1 if on tenure track 
.250 
(.433) 
= 
.262 
(.440) 
Bachelors 
Binary = 1 if highest degree 
earned is a bachelors 
.009 
(.095) 
< 
.013 
(.113) 
Masters 
Binary = 1 if highest degree 
earned is masters 
.163 
(.369) 
< 
.201 
(.400) 
Profession 
Binary = 1 if highest degree is 
professional 
.041 
(.197) 
< 
.059 
(.235) 
Doctorate 
Binary = 1 if highest degree 
earned is Ph.D. or equivalent 
.787 
(.410) 
> 
.726 
(.446) 
Citizen Binary = 1 if U.S. citizen 
.912 
(.284) 
= 
.916 
(.278) 
Funded 
Binary = 1 if scholarly activity 
funded by external agency 
.314 
(.464) 
< 
.345 
(.475) 
Firstjob 
Binary = 1 if current job is first 
since graduating 
.388 
(.487) 
= 
.401 
(.490) 
Articles Total refereed articles published 
14.11 
(26.34) 
< 
15.06 
(29.27) 
Nonref 
Total non-refereed articles 
published 
8.06 
(37.77) 
> 
7.20 
(22.32) 
Books Total books published 
4.13 
(12.25) 
= 
3.94 
(16.03) 
Presentation Total research presentations made 
35.97 
(86.78) 
= 
37.91 
(96.77) 
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Unionized 
 Non-
Unionized 
Pubdoc 
Binary = 1 if institution is public, 
doctoral granting 
.360 
(.480) 
> 
.339 
(.473) 
Privdoc 
Binary = 1 if institution is private, 
doctoral granting 
.018 
(.133) 
< 
.144 
(.351) 
Pubcomp 
Binary = 1 if institution is public, 
comprehensive 
.503 
(.500) 
> 
.175 
(.380) 
Privcomp 
Binary = 1 if institution is private, 
comprehensive 
.036 
(.185) 
< 
.116 
(.320) 
Publa 
Binary = 1 if institution is public, 
liberal arts 
.025 
(.157) 
> 
.012 
(.111) 
Privla 
Binary = 1 if institution is private, 
liberal arts 
.026 
(.158) 
< 
.143 
(.350) 
Enrollment Total Student FTE (thousands) 
12.76 
(9.25) 
> 
11.09 
(10.64) 
N Number of Faculty Observations 4,590  19,590 
Nj Number of Institutions 210  850 
Note: >,< represent statistical differences using a paired t-test at the 5% level. 
 
Empirical Results 
Base Results 
Using institutional-level random effects, the estimated coefficients on the union variable 
(α) and the interaction terms for each field (k) from equation (1) are summed to calculate the 
percentage change in Basic Salary for faculty in each of the 25 academic disciplines.18 These 
results are given in the first column of Table 5, which lists disciplines ranked from lowest to 
highest average Basic Salary. Consistent with Hedrick et al. (2011), the estimated impact of 
Union on overall wages, α = -0.045, is near zero and statistically insignificant (t =-1.70).19 
Despite the absence of an overall union impact, Table 5 reports that faculty in a number of 
                                                 
18 The results using the ACRAA cost of living adjustment follow a similar pattern and are available from the 
authors. 
 
19 All standard errors have been corrected for the clustering of faculty within institution. 
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disciplines gain large and statistically significant wage benefits. For instance, unionized faculty 
in area and ethnic studies fields are estimated to earn 11.1% higher salaries than non-unionized 
faculty in these fields. Other faculty with statistically positive gains from unionization are those 
in foreign languages, English, and philosophy. On the other hand, faculty in fields such as 
business, agriculture, engineering, computer science, and the health and legal professions earn 
less under unionization than their non-unionized counterparts. In general, those fields that suffer 
the greatest declines are precisely those with the highest opportunity cost faculty, and vice versa. 
An alternate view of the impact of unions on the distribution of salaries amongst full-time 
faculty is provided in Figure 1, where the estimated percentage change in Basic Salary (α + k) 
reported in Table 5 is plotted against average Basic Salary for each discipline. The graph 
underscores the flattening of the wage distribution curve, whereby unionized faculty in high-
income fields experience relative reductions in salary while other faculty in low-income fields 
see their salaries increase. As is demonstrated by the regression line in Figure 1, for each $1,000 
increase in a discipline’s average Basic Salary, the discipline can expect to lose four-tenths of 
one percentage point of the estimated wage premium associated with unionization. 
 
Table 5  
Union Impact on Real Basic Salary, All Observations 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Specification RE 2SLS, RE 2SLS, FE 
 Discipline N α + k α + k α + k 
Arts Visual and performing arts 1,590 
0.022 
(.022) 
.108** 
(.046) 
0.108* 
(.056) 
Eng English language and literature 1,750 
0.043*** 
(.016) 
.142*** 
(.045) 
0.144*** 
(.055) 
Foreign Foreign languages/literature 1,210 
0.057*** 
(.017) 
.124*** 
(.044) 
0.151*** 
(.055) 
Libr Library sciences 60 
-0.036 
(.040) 
-.041 
(.091) 
-0.033 
(.101) 
Rec Parks/recreation/leisure 250 
0.025 
(.029) 
.059 
(.059) 
0.062 
(.067) 
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  (1) (2) (3) 
Specification RE 2SLS, RE 2SLS, FE 
 Discipline N α + k α + k α + k 
Comm 
Communication/ 
journalism 
510 
-0.045* 
(.025) 
.012 
(.057) 
0.015 
(.066) 
Edu Education 1,900 
0.014 
(.013) 
.092** 
(.040) 
0.089* 
(.052) 
Area 
Area/ethnic/cultural/ 
gender studies 
70 
0.111*** 
(.041) 
.164 
(.106) 
0.142 
(.106) 
Phil Philosophy, religion & theology 1,090 
0.038* 
(.020) 
.172*** 
(.048) 
0.158*** 
(.059) 
Other Other 220 
-0.045* 
(.031) 
.082 
(.057) 
0.079 
(.078) 
Family Family/consumer sciences 180 
0.013 
(.029) 
.167** 
(.071) 
.182** 
(.078) 
Multi Multi/interdisciplinary studies 60 
-0.022 
(.052) 
.159 
(.111) 
0.175 
(.116) 
Arch Architecture and related services 180 
0.047 
(.034) 
.224*** 
(.086) 
0.237** 
(.095) 
Math Mathematics and statistics 1,060 
0.016 
(.018) 
.072 
(.048) 
0.082 
(.06) 
PubAdmin Public admin./social services 220 
0.0001 
(.029) 
.031 
(.057) 
0.03 
(.065) 
Psych Psychology 930 
-0.011 
(.019) 
.017 
(.052) 
0.024 
(.062) 
SocSci Social sciences and history 3,000 
0.01 
(.013) 
.094** 
(.043) 
0.107** 
(.055) 
Comp Computer sciences 610 
-0.041* 
(.023) 
-.010 
(.054) 
-0.009 
(.064) 
Psciences Physical sciences 1,520 
-0.004 
(.015) 
.055 
(.046) 
0.064 
(.056) 
Ag Agriculture/natural resources 410 
-0.06** 
(.025) 
.056 
(.094) 
0.062 
(.066) 
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  (1) (2) (3) 
Specification RE 2SLS, RE 2SLS, FE 
 Discipline N α + k α + k α + k 
Bio 
Biological and biomedical 
sciences 
1,880 
-0.025 
(.017) 
-.003 
(.050) 
0.04 (.06) 
Bus 
Business/management/ 
marketing 
1,610 
-.068*** 
(.021) 
-.027 
(.055) 
-0.038 
(.066) 
Health 
Health professions/clinical 
sciences 
2,190 
-
0.065*** 
(.021) 
-.112** 
(.050) 
-0.075 
(.064) 
Engin Engineering and related 1,170 
-0.038** 
(.019) 
.040 
(.052) 
0.044 
(.062) 
Legal Legal professions and studies 330 
-0.153** 
(.0164) 
-.272*** 
(.100) 
-0.265** 
(.111) 
Note: *** {**} [*] represent statistical significance at the 99% {95%} [90%] level. Standard errors of α+βk corrected for 
clustering at the institutional level are in parenthesis.  All models include all variables displayed in Table 4 and squares of 
enrollment, Exp, Degexp, and binary variables indicating survey period.  The random effects (RE) models also include binaries 
for each state. 
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Figure 1  
Discipline-Specific Impacts of Unionization 
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Causation and Sensitivity Tests 
The results presented this far are suggestive of wage compression caused by unionization. 
However, alternative explanations are possible. For instance, if institutions with relatively 
homogeneous inter-disciplinary salaries are more likely to unionize, then one would expect the 
results in Figure 1 to occur not because unions caused them, but instead simply because unions 
were more likely to form under these conditions.20 To determine the causal impact of unions on 
faculty wage distributions, we control for this type of selection bias using an instrumental 
variable. As suggested by Krieg et al. (2013), a candidate for such an instrument is the prior level 
                                                 
20 As mentioned earlier, unions may also cause faculty to select towards or away from unionized institutions. The 
impacts of sorting on the wage distribution is another mechanism, along with bargaining, by which unions can affect 
the wage distribution. 
 
19
Wassell et al.: Wage Distribution Impacts of Higher Education Faculty Unionizatio
Published by The Keep, 2015
 Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy  ISSN 1941-8043 
Vol. 7, December, 2015  
© 2015 National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education 
 
of private sector unionization in the state in which the institution is located. States with histories 
of high levels of unionization are more likely to have sentiment, legislation, and policies that 
make the unionization of faculty more likely. To be specific, our instrument is the percentage of 
nonagricultural workers in an institution’s state that were unionized during 1964 (Mem64).21 As 
demonstrated in Figure 2, among all 4-year institutions listed by NCSCBHEP, unionization 
began in the late 1960s, peaked in the early 1970s, and was nearly complete by the mid-1980s. 
By choosing our instrument to predate faculty unionization, we eliminate any mechanical 
correlation between university unions and Mem64. We use Wooldridge’s (2010) recommended 
two-stage instrumental variables technique. In the first stage, we estimate separate probits for 
tenured/tenure track and non-tenure track faculty.22 Each probit regresses Union on Mem64, Z 
and T and from each, we save the predicted probabilities of unionization. In the second stage, we 
utilize these predicted probabilities as instruments for the variable Union in equation (1). 
Identifying the impact of unions on the wage distribution in this manner relies on the dual 
assumptions that Mem64 is uncorrelated with the error term in (1) and Mem64 is correlated with 
Union. As to the first assumption, we believe this is justified for at least two reasons. First, it 
seems unlikely that the extent of unionization in a state forty years in the past is correlated with 
the unexplained portion of an individual’s wages. However, even if states with high union 
activity in 1964 are likely to have higher university salaries later due to unobserved state-level 
effects, these will be purged from (1) by the inclusion in that equation of the state-level fixed 
effects, Ss. With respect to the correlation between Mem64 and Union, the first stage coefficients 
of 0.053 (t = 12.5) for tenured/tenure track and 0.037 (t = 5.82) for non-tenure track are 
statistically significant and large in magnitude. For instance, the tenure/tenure-track coefficient is 
equivalent to a 1.2% percentage-point increase in the likelihood that an institution unionizes for 
each percentage-point increase in its state’s 1964 unionization rate.23 
 
                                                 
21 Mem64 varies considerably across states with the highest being Michigan (44.8%) to South Carolina (7%). The 
average institution experienced a Mem64 of 28%. This data is available under the title “State Union Membership 
Density in the U.S., 1964-2008” at unionstats.gsu.edu. 
 
22 We treat tenured/tenure track and non-tenure track observations differently because unions can represent either, 
one, or both types of faculty on a campus depending upon state law. For instance, the University of California 
system has non-tenure track faculty represented but not tenured/tenure track. 
 
23 An additional regression using an alternative instrument – the percent of a state’s workforce that was unionized 24 
years prior to the NSOPF survey – yields results highly similar to those from the Mem64 regression. The benefit of 
the alternative instrument is that it exhibits variation within states; however, it suffers with respect to ease of 
exposition, as well as the fact that the 1980 observation occurs after most of the unionization in higher education. 
Results of the alternative regression are available upon request. 
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Figure 2  
Dates of Initial Unionization for Tenured and Tenure Track Faculty 
 
 
    Source: Boris (2006). 
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this higher value of α reduces the number of fields that experience a decrease in Basic Salary as 
a result of unionization. Second, as expected from any two-stage estimation process, the standard 
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the base model. Even in light of this, fields such as the arts, English, foreign languages, 
education, and philosophy experience positive, statistically significant union wage premia while 
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Figure 3  
Discipline-Specific Impacts of Unionization, 2SLS 
Another concern involves the potentially strong assumption implicit in random effects that 
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third column of Table 5. The similarities between the second and third columns are striking. 
Both the signs and magnitudes of the estimates are substantively the same for almost all fields.24 
Extensions 
Faculty Type 
One concern with the preceding analysis is that it mixes tenured and tenure track faculty 
with non-tenure track observations. While non-tenure track observations make up a minority of 
total observations (19.1%), it is conceivable that non-tenure track unions have different objective 
functions than unions representing tenure track faculty members. To explore the effect of 
combining these two groups, we drop the non-tenure track observations and re-estimate equation 
(1) for just tenured and tenure track faculty members. Results from this exercise are displayed in 
Figure 4. Like the earlier OLS results, the overall impact of unions on wages is small, negative, 
and insignificantly different than zero (α = -0.033, t = -1.45). There is also no substantive 
difference in differences between fields with the more highly paid fields receiving less at 
unionized institutions relative to non-unionized ones. Like the results in Figure 1, an increase in 
average salary of $1,000 reduces a discipline’s union wage premium by four-tenths of one 
percentage point. Given this, combining non-tenure and tenure track faculty appears not to 
change the overall finding that unions tend to level wages across disciplines. 
                                                 
24 The presence of state level dummy variables in the random effects model and their necessary exclusion from the 
fixed effects model precludes comparison of the two model using the standard Hausman test. When we drop the 
state level dummy variables from the random effects model and perform a chi-squared test of equality between the α 
and βk’s from the institutional-level fixed effect model, we fail to reject the null that the coefficients differ from 
each other (p = 0.158). 
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Figure 4  
Discipline-Specific Impacts of Unionization, Tenure Track Faculty Only 
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Institution Type 
Because different types of institutions have different missions and potentially different 
pools of labor from which to draw, it is possible that these differences might be related to the 
finding that unionization benefits lower-paid faculty at the expense of higher-paid faculty. For 
instance, if the faculty markets for doctoral institutions are more competitive than those for 
liberal arts schools, one might expect unionization to have impacts on the wage distribution that 
differ by institution type. We estimate equation (1) separately for three classes of institutions: 
comprehensive, doctoral, and liberal arts schools.25 In all three cases, there is a negative 
relationship between the size of the union wage premium and a discipline’s average Basic 
Salary, though this is statistically significant only at doctoral and comprehensive institutions. 
The largest impact appears in comprehensives, which experience a decline in the union wage 
premium of seven-tenths of one percentage point for each $1,000 increase in a discipline’s 
average salary. Doctoral institutions exhibit a slightly smaller six-tenths of one percentage point 
reduction. Liberal arts schools demonstrate an even more negative relationship between the 
                                                 
25As defined by the Carnegie classification system of higher education institutions. 
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union wage premium and average salary, though this slope is not statistically significant. For 
liberal arts schools, the estimated α is -0.135, though this is statistically insignificant (t = -0.97). 
In contrast, the estimated impact of unions on overall wages was much smaller at doctoral 
institutions (α = 0.044, t = 0.35) and comprehensive universities (α = 0.112, t = 0.113). 
Union Persistence and Growth 
The empirical results shed some light on why faculty unions may persist even in the 
absence of an overall union wage premium. Given that unions tilt the wage distribution in favor 
of lower-paid disciplines at the expense of higher-paid ones, it is possible that a majority of 
faculty benefit from unions and, through a median voter mechanism, push for their continuance 
or establishment on non-unionized campuses. Figure 5 depicts the cumulative distribution of 
union impacts on faculty salaries. When the entire sample using Basic Salary is analyzed, 51.7% 
of faculty are estimated to earn more under unionization. 26 However, this result becomes more 
striking when the sample is divided into institution type as is demonstrated in Figure 6. Within 
comprehensive universities, 78.5% of faculty receive a positive wage benefit from unionization 
while just over 17% of faculty at doctoral institutions gain. At liberal arts universities, only 8% 
of observations experience the positive wage benefits of collective bargaining.27 This may 
contribute to the fact that among the 20 most recent switches from non-union to union status 
among higher education institutions, a majority were comprehensive universities while no liberal 
arts institutions formed new unions.28 
 
                                                 
26 This percentage rises to 56.7% when Total Salary is used as the salary measure 
 
27 This may occur because the variance of wages across disciplines in liberal arts institutions is significantly lower 
than the variance at other types of schools leaving less room for unions to impact the distribution. 
 
28 Among the 20 most recent switches from non-union to union status included 10 comprehensive universities, 3 
doctoral institutions, and 7 community/technical colleges. Source: Boris (2006). 
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Figure 5 
Cumulative Distribution Function of Union Wage Effects on Basic Salary 
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Figure 6  
Cumulative Distribution Function of Union Wage Effects on Basic Salary, By Institution Type 
-0.25 -0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
 + 
F
(
 +
 
)
 
 
Doctoral
Comprehensive
Liberal Arts
 
26
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 4
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol7/iss1/4
 Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy  ISSN 1941-8043 
Vol. 7, December, 2015  
© 2015 National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education 
 
Clearly it would be naïve to argue that only faculty who stand to gain financially will vote 
for unionization and only those who lose will vote against it; there are obviously other important 
factors such as effects on fringe benefits, working conditions, and faculty governance, as well as 
differential interest in unionization between faculty in different disciplines. Nevertheless, these 
findings provide some support for the median voter theorem premise for unionization. 
So far, we have focused on the wage premia earned by full-time faculty members. 
Depending upon state laws, however, part-time faculty may also participate in collective 
bargaining. If part-time faculty receive a wage premium and are part of the same bargaining unit 
as full-time faculty, they would be likely to join forces with full-time faculty who stand to gain 
and to vote for unionization. Of the 780 institutions that had collective bargaining agreements in 
2004, 56% had agreements that covered part-time faculty. A majority of those institutions, 55%, 
had both full-time and part-time faculty who bargain collectively. While the data do not allow 
one to ascertain when full-time and part-time faculty are part of the same bargaining unit, it is 
likely that this is the case at many institutions. In the only study to date that has attempted to 
measure the union wage for part-time faculty, Monks (2007) finds a statistically significant 10% 
premium for those who participate in collective bargaining. His findings are suggestive that part-
time faculty might vote along with full-time faculty who expect to gain from collective 
bargaining. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Using a comprehensive dataset on full-time faculty members in U.S. colleges and 
universities, we find that unionization causes a significant flattening of the distribution of wages 
across academic disciplines. These effects control for individual-level measures that impact 
salary such as experience, tenure, rank, academic productivity, and demographics. The flattening 
of the distribution of wages is strongest at comprehensive institutions, also present in doctoral 
institutions, and less likely to occur at liberal arts schools. This flattening generates gains at the 
lower end of the wage distribution at the expense of higher-paid faculty, with no detectable 
change in overall average salaries. The distribution of expected gains from unionization is 
somewhat positively skewed; that is, the gains are positive at the median of the wage 
distribution. This positive skew is more prevalent at doctoral and comprehensive institutions and 
provides some explanation for the widespread success of unionization votes and the extreme 
rarity of decertification efforts. 
There is reason to believe that these results may understate the actual shift in the wage 
distribution across disciplines. As Card et al. (2003) point out, the statistical challenge is to 
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develop a methodology that controls for the effects that the presence of unions may have on the 
level and distribution of wages in the non-union sector. Once unions are formed, the benefits 
they convey may draw workers away from the non-union sector. Equally plausible is that some 
workers may wish to avoid the more structured environment that unions provide. The resulting 
selection bias distorts estimates of union impacts using statistical methods such as those 
employed herein. If, for example, workers with high opportunity costs avoid union jobs, the 
resulting selection bias will lead to underestimation of the union/non-union wage differential. 
Self-selection will also increase the variation in wages between establishments while decreasing 
the variation within both union and non-union establishments.29 
Of course, faculty choose to unionize for a wide variety of reasons in addition to salary 
gains. For example, some may be motivated by expectations or hopes of more attractive teaching 
loads, better fringe benefits, and/or stronger faculty governance. The question of what factors 
determine unionization is one that deserves further investigation. Another interesting question 
concerns the effects of this wage compression on faculty satisfaction. This has important 
implications for faculty governance and the ability of faculty in diverse disciplines to cooperate 
on matters of common interest. Finally, the flattening of the wage distribution across disciplines 
within an institution has implications for the quality of faculty hired at that university. If low-
opportunity-cost disciplines are paid more at unionized than at non-unionized schools, one might 
expect unionized institutions to attract and keep higher-quality faculty in these disciplines. As a 
result, one might expect a shift of educational and research quality from non-unionized to 
unionized institutions in low-cost fields and from unionized to non-unionized institutions in high 
cost fields. We leave these issues for further exploration. 
                                                 
29 For a further discussion of these issues, see Lemieux (1993, 1998), Card (1996), and Abowd and Farber (1982). 
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